

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 35/80
11 March 1980
Copy 1

*DCI has seen --
used in mtg
w/Sec Def 3/21*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



VIA: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: US No-SALT Options.

1. As you consider whether to press Secretary Brown to accede to retaining the US No-SALT projection in the NIE, please be aware that OSD is considering some other alternatives. The attached page summarizes the key aspects of the projection in the NIE, which we got from PA&E. It compares them with the SALT-limited FYDP projection and with what we have been able to learn about alternatives now under consideration. The alternatives have not been worked out in the detail needed for graphics in the NIE.

2. You can see from the attachment that there is only one difference which could significantly affect the graphs and conclusions. It is item 4, which suggests a possibility of major expansion in MX force goals. Frankly, I don't believe this is really feasible by 1989.


Howard Stortz, Jr. 

25X1A


25X1

Attachment

OSD review completed

25X1

cc: Chairman, National Intelligence Council



SECRET

SECRET

11 March 1980

US No-SALT from PA&E:

1. Twice as many ALCMs as under SALT (about 6,000 vice 3,000); includes CMCs.
2. One more Trident (13 vice 12); includes two D-5-equipped.
3. Larger MPS deployment if necessary (up to 8,200 in 1989 vice 4,600).
4. MX same No-SALT as SALT (200 in 1989)
5. Adds MM in rather than deactivating (650 in 1989 vice 260 in 1989 under SALT. Note: there are 550 now).
6. ABM deployment to protect MX if necessary.

OSD Alternatives (based on Slocombe's 1985 and 1989 aggregate figures):

1. ALCMs ranging from about the same as SALT to as high or somewhat higher than above; includes CMCs (and possibly B-1?).
2. SLBMs about the same as above.
3. MPS about the same as above.
4. MX about 300 vice 200, 12 RVs each vice 10.
5. MM III remains 550 as at present.
6. ABM option as above.

Total Online US Weapons -

	<u>SALT</u>	<u>No-SALT (PA&E)</u>	<u>No-SALT Alt.</u>
1985	10,000	12,000	12-13,500
1989	13,000	18,000	17-23,000

SECRET

ENTIRE TEXT

Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300080005-7

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

80-6631

MAR 7 1980

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Stan:

I cannot accept the draft of the strategic NIE which you sent me on February 26. The discussions of trends in Soviet forces are balanced and helpful, but they get lost in the mass of force exchange calculations. More important, I cannot agree to the continued inclusion in the draft of net assessment discussions. It swamps the intelligence analysis with highly "assumptions-dependent" material on US forces and doctrine. It also brings into the estimate material that has no place there and that should be done--and is being done--in the Defense Department.

Intelligence estimates cannot properly serve as the forum for net assessments. Any particular calculation or set of calculations--whether that of the SAGA analysis referred to in the draft, or of the CIA-conducted analysis that provides much of the material in the draft, or of the PA&E work reflected in the Defense Report for FY 81--is highly dependent for its validity on the forces, scenarios and tactics assumed. No one or even two sets of exchange calculations can properly be given the status inevitably associated with inclusion in an NIE. The process of analyzing the interaction of US and Soviet forces requires a wholly different additional set of skills and brings to bear a wholly different additional set of considerations from that of intelligence analysis. To try to equate Soviet capabilities with these postulated forces must surely result in the warping and twisting of US foreign intelligence analysis over the longer term. *No interaction*

Use of an NIE as a vehicle for publishing net assessment analyses is made particularly inappropriate by the fact that the results depend at least as much on assumptions made about US forces and tactics in the future as on those made about the Soviets. The intelligence estimating process is sufficiently complex and uncertain without compounding it by attempting a staff-level prediction of how US decision programs would be adjusted to future events. It is fundamentally misleading to compare, for example, programmed *None*

SECRET

Declassify 10 Mar 80

Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300080005-7

ENTIRE TEXT

SECRET

2

US "SALT" forces with hypothesized Soviet "no-SALT" forces. Introducing postulated US "no-SALT" forces is no real help. Even if, as I assume to be the case, DoD staff contributes to the development of the assumed US forces, the resulting forces have no authoritative standing whatsoever. We are, in fact, in the process of updating our planning for how the US would react to the collapse of the SALT process and thus no analyses based on your (or other) assumed US programs are valid.

Estimates of what the Soviets may do in the future are predictive and properly a function of intelligence. Estimates of what the US will do that are published in an authoritative USG publication are inevitably prescriptive and impact on the process of decision on US programs. It is in the Department of Defense, in connection with preparation of our long term defense, that our future strategic nuclear programs must be developed, not in the intelligence community's preparation of an intelligence estimate. Put another--and starker--way, who should be the ultimate single authority for predicting what US forces are likely to be given intelligence-projected Soviet forces. Perhaps the Secretary of Defense is the most appropriate candidate. Certainly the DCI is not. It follows that the NIE, whose text (except for the footnotes) is decoded solely by the DCI, is not the appropriate vehicle for net assessment.

Net assessment is, of course, an important task. It is for that reason that I operate a Net Assessments Directorate here in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that the CJCS' SAGA Group and my programming and analysis staff in PA&E continually conduct analyses relevant to strategic (and other) net assessments. I recognize the interest of other agencies of the government in this issue, and it is for this reason that I am circulating the SAGA study and the PA&E analysis to the other NSC agencies. But in doing so, I will make clear that neither of these analyses (which themselves differ in scenario and assumptions) is necessarily "the" right answer or the complete answer to the question.

The issue here is not the independence of the intelligence community or the need to understand US forces in order to grasp the strategic balance. It is the policy question of the relative role of estimating Soviet actions--the proper task of the intelligence community--and of analysis and recommendations concerning appropriate US programs to respond to Soviet forces and meet our national policy objectives--which is the proper task of the Department of Defense. I welcome suggestions for improving DoD's net assessment effort, but I cannot accept, ad hoc, inclusion of even limited net assessment analysis in a national intelligence estimate.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300080005-7

3

I therefore request that all the exchange calculations now included in the draft of NIE 11-3/8-79 be removed. If you conclude that you cannot agree to this course, please let me know so that I can raise the issue with the President before the NIE is issued.

"NONE
IN IT."

Harold Brown

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300080005-7